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CONVERSATIONS ON 
THE GLOBAL SOUTH
The South on the South 
Interview with Raewyn Connell
In the !rst of a series of conversations about the Global South, Social 
Transformations: Journal of the Global South editors Lisandro E. 
Claudio and Karl Cheng Chua (STJGS) speak to Raewyn Connell (RC) 
about the generating conversations about the Global South in the Global 
South.
STJGS: A lot of people ignore the concept of the Global South. Why 
is that?
RC: Many social scientists have been educated in Britain or have 
done PhDs in the United States, and they think, “!at’s theory! !at’s 
Bourdieu, that’s Habermas, that’s Marx, that’s Weber.” People educated 
that way, wherever they are educated, are not likely to talk about the 
Global South. !ey’re not interested in colonial and post-colonial 
societies. Why should they be? Bourdieu, Habermas, Durkheim—
that’s theory. !at’s the disciplinary framework that so many of us have 
learnt.
STJGS: Many scholars and commentators equate the Global South 
with the !ird World. In your work, however, you discuss Southern 
!eory in the context of Aboriginal Australia. People don’t really 
think of a"uent Australia when they discuss the !ird World. Is 
your conception of the Global South, then, a departure from previous 
de#nitions?
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RC: My usage of the term “Global South” in texts like Southern 
!eory (Connell 2007) is based on previous uses, though I’m trying 
perhaps to do something di!erent with the concept. "e language 
of “Global South/Global North” came into use largely in the 1960s 
in the context of United Nations discussions about trade and 
development. "is was in the days when the UN trade negotiations 
led by Raul Prebisch were getting underway, with the impulse from 
what was called the “G77”—seventy-seven developing countries 
who had an agenda for economic development and needed a trade 
policy. 
So the term “Global South” began in the context of the geopolitics 
of development, of post-colonial development. "at’s important to 
note, because it means the concept of the Global South is not a 
static concept, and not an abstract one. It refers to an economic and 
political process in which the interests of societies and countries 
in the post-colonial world are sometimes opposed to those of the 
former colonizers (the rich countries of the Global North). 
So that’s where the language came from. "at was a little bit 
di!erent from the language of the “"ird World,” which came out 
of the 1950s. "ere was an attempt to de#ne a third position in 
world politics, which was neither the Soviet bloc nor the United 
States’ capitalist bloc. "e famous Bandung Conference illustrates 
that. And then the concept of the “"ird World” was picked up in 
development studies, in the context of debates about global poverty 
and the unequal distribution of global resources. 
So I mostly use the language of Global South and Global 
North. Sometimes I refer to “metropole” and “periphery.” "at is 
also a language with problems, because what was periphery does not 
always remain periphery! 
But that terminology is also useful, because it allows you to 
think of a case like Australia, which is quite interesting. Australia 
is a settler colonial country with an indigenous population, which 
was massively impacted by colonization. "e indigenous population 
is mostly poor and marginalized, with major health problems and 
lower expectation of life than the settler population. A lot of the 
settler culture in Australia has, for the last hundred years or so, 
essentially ignored indigenous people and indigenous culture. We 
have acted as if we were the 51st state of the United States, or an 
extra county of Britain, or an extra province of France. "ere has 
been a massive cultural denial of being a settler colony. 
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!ere is also a cultural problem in Australia of relationships with 
the metropole. An Australian literary critic of sixty years ago devised 
the term “the cultural cringe” to describe the attitude of Australian 
intellectuals towards Europe. !e cultural cringe is the assumption 
that our culture is always inferior to European culture, that we should 
look to Europe for taste and theory and wisdom, and that our own 
stu" is always second rate. 
Now, in the academic world, that takes a form that we have a name 
for. It has been called academic dependency, or, even better, it is what 
the Beninese philosopher Paulin Hountondji (who, I think, is a very 
important philosopher) calls “extraversion.”  !at means the attitude of 
intellectuals in the post-colonial world of looking at the Global North 
as the source of intellectual authority. 
Hountondji’s work is important (see Hountondji 1983, 1997, 
2002). After a critique of popular misunderstandings about “African 
philosophy,” he began to develop a global political economy of 
knowledge. He pointed out that, under colonialism, there was not 
only a material economy of exploitation of the colonized. !ere was 
also an economy of knowledge, where the colonized world became a 
source of data for science (natural science and social sciences alike), 
and that data was taken back to Europe or North America. !ere, it 
was processed by theory. !e result was that theory was located in the 
metropole, while a great deal of data collection occurs in the colony. 
You still see the survival of that process in the botanical gardens of the 
North, which collect botanical specimens from all over the colonized 
world. You see it also in anthropological museums, art museums, and 
so forth. 
But Hountondji also points out that this global relationship 
continued into the post-colonial era. We still, in most of the global 
periphery, send our bright students o" to the United States to do a 
Ph.D., to Britain, to Germany, to France, for a higher degree. We 
try to publish in their journals; we get prestige and promotion if we 
publish in their journals. When we have leave, we go o" to the Global 
North to spend some time in a laboratory there, or to work in a famous 
department in the social sciences.
!is is normal practice in academic life. So that even today, #fty 
or sixty years after the main wave of decolonization, and a couple of 
hundred years after decolonization in Latin America, we still have this 
pattern of intellectual authority being located in the Global North. 
!eory production is located in the Global North. And intellectuals in 
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the periphery, to the extent they participate in the global economy of 
knowledge, do so in a subordinated position. 
Now, that’s true of relatively rich parts of the Global South as well 
as relatively poor parts. !at’s true of Australia as well as Indonesia. 
!at is why I think the concepts of Global North and Global South 
are really useful for intellectual analysis. !ese concepts enable us to 
name a key axis of authority and dependence in intellectual life, and 
that’s why I think it’s important to use this terminology. !ey are a 
starting point; they’re not the end, they’re not the solution. !ey don’t 
mean that either the Global North or the Global South is homogenous 
or static—far from it.
STJGS: As a leading critic of the universalization of Western and 
Northern knowledge, you contended that scholars view Southern 
knowledge as limited. Why is that so?
RC: !is follows pretty much from the pattern that Hountondji 
identi"ed. Scholars in the Global South tend to think of themselves as 
“local experts.” !ey see themselves as having empirical knowledge of 
their own society if they are social scientists, or their own fauna if they 
are biologists, or their own geology if they are geoscientists, etc. But 
they tend to think that the generalized knowledge—the broad picture, 
the abstractions, the theory—is produced in the top universities of the 
Global North. 
So there is a tendency—it’s not complete, but it’s a strong 
tendency—for scientists, including social scientists, in the Global 
South to assume that they only have a local audience and that their 
knowledge is encapsulated or limited to the local situation. It is crucial 
that we change this attitude. We need to see the Global South as a 
source of intellectual authority, as a source of theory, as a source of 
general ideas which have the capacity to develop and spread and gain 
recognition elsewhere. 
It’s crucial for scholars in the Global South to talk to each other 
and not just to the Global North. If work gets published in the Global 
North, it gets read in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. But if it’s 
published in Australia, it doesn’t. Publications in the Global South 
don’t circulate across the Global South. Very few people in Australia 
read African publications. Only area specialists read Latin American 
publications, or know about Latin American intellectuals, unless 
they’re published in the Global North. So you get someone becoming 
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famous like Paulo Freire—the Brazilian educator, a very interesting 
educator concerned with literacy and social justice—who gets known 
in Australia because he was published in New York.
!is is hard work, to build these links. But I think it is really 
important to have cross-fertilization across the Global South, as well 
as communication with the Global North. I’m not suggesting for a 
moment that we ignore intellectual production from the Global 
North—that would be ridiculous. But we do need to know, and 
scholars in the United States and Europe need to know, that theory 
from the North is not the only theory there is! 
STJGS: Going back to what you mentioned early on about the 
metropole and the periphery: Even in the Global South there are 
structures of internal hegemony. For example, in the Philippines, if you 
publish in Filipino, there are still eight linguistic groups that may not 
have the capacity to understand endemic writing in the Philippines. 
RC: !is is absolutely true, and I think it’s true everywhere. Australia, 
which has a relatively egalitarian academic system, is currently 
becoming more hierarchical, with some elite universities and other 
less-elite ones. We have some recent empirical evidence of that 
developed by a colleague of mine at the University of Sydney. In 
places like Brazil and India, those hierarchies are quite serious. !ere 
are some relatively well-funded universities and research institutes, 
a lot that are less well-funded where teaching and research are done 
under great "nancial di#culties. And then there are parts of the 
higher education system that have e$ectively no research capacity at 
all. 
So I do agree that hierarchy within the Global South is itself a 
major issue. It has some resemblances to the structure of relations 
between the Global North and the Global South, and some 
di$erences. !e language issue is important.
And this is connected with another set of issues that I haven’t 
talked about yet, but which we do have to get into the picture: the 
relationship between the social sciences in general and popular 
audiences and social movements. !e university world in general is 
a world of relative privilege. Most working-class and peasant young 
people don’t go to university, and can’t possibly a$ord to. Yet the 
knowledge that we produce in social science should be relevant to 
them, and should become available to them. 
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So, how we connect knowledge production in elite, privileged 
institutions with the education needs of the “popular classes” (as they 
are called in Latin America) is a really big issue. We haven’t been 
thinking about this very much within the university world. Of course, 
there are people and institutions who dedicate themselves to that kind 
of outreach, or that kind of service. 
!e current di"culty is that we are now in a world of neoliberalism, 
market ideology. University systems around the world are very much 
impacted by neoliberal management techniques, by performance 
management. University managers have become obsessed with league 
tables, with competitive positioning, with quanti#cation of output. 
When you look at the measures that are used, they are largely centered 
on the Global North—for instance, citation indexes, league tables for 
journals. We are supposed to publish in the top journals and, lo and 
behold, the top journals are all North American or British. 
In sociology, for instance, of the top twenty journals in the journal 
rankings, nineteen are from the United States and the other one is 
from Britain. Nobody in the popular classes in the Philippines or India 
or Latin America is going to read them! !e neoliberal dynamic in 
universities is pushing us away from the democracy of social science 
in a very disturbing way. We are encountering that issue, now, very 
sharply, but have hardly begun to debate it in a serious way. I #nd 
that very worrying. I have talked about these questions in Confronting 
Equality (Connell 2011). And I’m very interested in the potential of a 
journal like yours to serve as a focus for that kind of discussion.
STJGS: Do you think a label such as “public intellectual,” then, can 
serve a purpose or solve that issue with regards to popularizing the 
scholarship that is produced by academics?
RC: Sometimes yes, and sometimes no. Because people who become 
known as public intellectuals are not always active researchers, not 
the most respected researchers. Well, I don’t want to name names 
but—I can think of people in Australia who would be regarded as 
public intellectuals. !ey are thirty years out of date in terms of their 
knowledge of the #eld. But they are good communicators! I guess one 
has to be patient and think, “Well, some outreach is better than none.” 
So I don’t criticize these people (at least not very much). But it is 
also important that the outreach be collective, not just individual. You 
don’t just want a small number of highly visible “stars” who appear on 
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television and have a Facebook following. We want a collective—a 
shared practice, which will operate in many di!erent forms.
For instance, I very much respect some colleagues who work 
in adult education forums. One colleague of mine, a very good 
academic—an innovative and interesting researcher—has recently 
given up her professorship in one of our well-known universities and 
is now a school teacher in Aboriginal communities in the Outback. 
Terri"c! #at’s just one dramatic example. I have a lot of respect for 
people who do that kind of thing. 
But look, there are lots of ways that academic social scientists 
can "nd audiences outside the academic world. We can work with 
social movements, with NGOs, with the unions. I think that’s quite an 
important forum, so I’ve done some work, for instance, with teachers’ 
unions.
Now that doesn’t get a lot of recognition in the university. You 
can put it on your vitae as “service,” “community service.” But it’s not 
counted very much for promotion. So there is some struggle to be 
undertaken within the university too. I want academics who do that 
also to be active researchers. It’s not easy, but combining an active 
research life with outreach and educational life is the pattern of 
academic work we need more of.
STJGS: You say that you’re sort of going with the idea that the 
term “Global South” is a very useful political tool. It is, for example, a 
category used to create solidarity among groups who oppose neoliberal 
globalization. But beyond political categories, how should one theorize 
the Global South?
RC: I think of all social science as essentially historical, so I always 
want us to think about social dynamics through time. And the biggest 
transformation of human society in the last 500 years is colonialism, 
European and then North American colonialism, both over-land and 
overseas. We should not forget that Russia and the United States were 
constituted by colonization—what the Americans called the “Westward 
Expansion” and what the Russians called “Eastward Expansion.” 
#e story included the overseas colonization by the Portuguese, the 
Spanish, the Dutch, the British, the French. #e creation of colonial 
social orders was the biggest revolution in modern history. It was not 
the Industrial Revolution, not the French Revolution; colonization is 
the most massive transformation in recent history. 
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And then, with decolonization strung out over the last 200 years, 
we have the formation of post-colonial societies. !is "rst happened 
in the Americas, in British and Spanish America. !en in the 20th 
century in other parts of the colonized world. And then we get the 
formation of post-colonial social orders, the creation of global markets, 
the global mass media, and so on. !is is the dynamic that the social 
sciences are fundamentally about, in my view. !e notion of Global 
South/Global North has to be theorized in that historical context of 
colonialism and post-colonial relationships. 
South and North are not so much geographical categories; they 
are relationships. !ey are the name for a bundle of economic, military, 
and cultural relations marked by centrality and marginality, by global 
structures of domination. And like all major social relationships, this is 
not static. !is is a dynamic relationship. !e center of imperial power 
has shifted, as we know, from Spain to Northern Europe to North 
America. Di#erent parts of the colonized world have broken free at 
di#erent times.
!ere have been di#erent projects of development, some of which 
have $ourished, some have not. We’ve had in the later 20th century an 
extraordinary growth of the oil industries and the changed relationship 
between the metropole and the Arab and Caribbean worlds because 
of that. We have seen the rise of Japanese power—the "rst signi"cant 
military riposte to European and North American colonialism and 
an alternative economic center of power. At the moment we have a 
second wave of industrialization from the formerly colonized world, 
notably among the Chinese and Indians. 
So all of this is tremendously dynamic. It’s not a static, top-bottom 
relationship, but a really complex, dynamic, and absolutely fascinating 
set of processes. Notions of South and North have to be taken as a 
starting point for what rapidly becomes a much more sophisticated, 
complex account of global social dynamics.
At the end of that account, maybe we don’t need the terms “North” 
and “South” any more, if we have more complex analyses in place. 
But as a shorthand way of talking about all of these issues, I think 
these terms are still intellectually useful. !ey are useful for naming 
colonialism and post-colonial centrality and dependence as central 
issues for the social sciences.
And that really is a shift. If you look, for instance, at the discipline 
of sociology, the dynamic of colonialism and post-colonial change has 
not been intellectually central in the discipline. When we think of the 
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major sociological theorists, they’re not centrally talking about this. 
!ink of Parsons, Luhmann, Habermas, Bourdieu, Foucault, Giddens. 
Immanuel Wallerstein made a serious attempt at global analysis, but 
his work turned into an odd form of systems theory, which didn’t pay 
attention to the intellectual production of the Global South—a pity, 
because it was a very creative intervention at the start. 
STJGS: Ever since Lenin, the broad Left has been tolerant of 
nationalism in the Global South. But in places like in the Indian 
subcontinent, there seems to be problems of First World nationalism—
racism, xenophobia, essentialism—transposed to the !ird World. 
How should we think of nationalism in post-colonial contexts?
RC: !at’s interesting and important. I would remark (without 
putting too much weight on this point) that it was actually Stalin 
who was the Bolshevik expert on nationality, because he was 
Georgian, not Russian, in origin. We associate Stalin so much with 
his later violent dictatorship that it’s easy to forget he was the person 
who crafted the nationalities policy of the Bolsheviks in a relatively 
inclusive and tolerant way.
I wouldn’t assume that such things as racist nationalism are 
just an import from Europe. !e 20th century racism that came 
out of Europe is partly a product of colonialism itself. Racists 
took into Europe some of the patterns of exclusion, hierarchy, 
and the essentialization of di"erence, which had emerged through 
imperialism in colonial societies, especially during the 19th century, 
when racism hardened in most European empires. If you look back 
further into the history of imperialism, there was often racial tolerance 
in the earlier empires. Something happened within imperialism that 
produced modern forms of racism and racist nationalism. I don’t 
know the full story.
Yes, if you look at India, for instance, or across the Indian 
subcontinent, the kind of exclusive nationalism that emerged in 
the partition (which was largely a British strategy) is extremely 
disturbing: for instance, the rise of Hindu nationalism in the BJP 
(Bharatiya Janata Party). I’m not close enough to the situation to 
give more than a very amateur interpretation. I have read arguments 
about Hindu nationalism which see it as a Europeanization of 
aspects of Indian culture—the transformation of Hinduism into a 
European-style religion with dogma, intolerance, and the rest of it. 
10 Social Transformations Vol. 1, No. 2, Aug. 2013
I’m not sure that I can say much more than this, except that it 
should certainly tell us that the notion of the Global South is not 
a moral category. We cannot see the Global North as evil and the 
Global South as moral, pure, and oppressed. I don’t think that at all. I 
remember when I began to publish the Southern !eory argument for 
the "rst time in 1997, one of the responses was to say, “!is is a guilt 
trip. !is is pinning guilt on Northern sociologists.” It was certainly 
not my intention to raise questions of guilt or innocence.
I did want to say that a simple sociology of knowledge argument 
applies to sociology itself, and to all the other social sciences. Of course 
they re#ect the social context in which they develop! It would be very 
strange if they did not. Unfortunately sociology as a discipline has not, 
for the most part, paid attention to the fact that the societies in which 
most sociological theory has been formed were the imperial centers, 
and that is a fact that matters. 
If you look at the details of the history of sociology—not just 
the myth of the “founding fathers,” but look at the textbooks and 
the courses of the "rst generation of sociology teaching—then you 
"nd something surprising. !e world of imperialism was the world 
that sociology was talking about, and data from the colonized were 
very important in the formation of late 19th  century sociology in the 
Global North. !at’s empirical fact; the data are there.
And my argument, essentially, is that we should pay attention 
to the reality of our own disciplinary history. Northern sociology 
did once speak about the world of empire. It did not, however, do 
so re#exively; it did not theorize itself as theory-from-the-metropole. 
!at is a perspective we have now; and in my view it is a key to the 
development of social science.
It opens up the possibility of a great pluralization of concepts and 
perspectives, as theory-from-the-South is recognized and encouraged. 
!at means a great enrichment and democratization of knowledge. 
!ere are many di$culties in understanding and practicing in such 
a world of knowledge, of course. But I would see this as potentially 
the most radical and exciting development in social science since the 
formation of our disciplines.
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